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This chapter is a critical engagement with the concept of objectivity borne out of a project where I as 
the researcher shared characteristics with the participants in the research project, namely that we 
were all LGBTQI+ barristers. The chapter summarises some of the findings of that research before 
going on to consider why distance or neutrality in research is not only an unrealistic expectation but 
is instrumental in maintaining problematic power dynamics. Through an exploration of feminist and 
queer thinking it goes on to explore strategies and approaches that can be used to think in a more 
engaged and ethical way about quality and rigour in research. 
Introduction 
As researchers we are often concerned that our research both is, and appears to be, objective. As 
lawyers too, objectivity is lauded as both attainable and desirable. This chapter is concerned with a 
moment in the planning of a research project where I had a (brief) crisis of conscience about my own 
ability to be objective. Writing this chapter (and a conference paper2 that preceded it) has allowed 
me to take that moment and use it to build my understanding of what I believe to be a crucially 
important issue that we as researchers sometimes take as given.  
This chapter arises out of a project on LGBTQI+ barristers.3 In undertaking this research we set out to 
look at the experiences of barristers who identified as LGBTQI+ in order to determine whether their 
sexuality played any role in their working lives, whether it lead to any disadvantage, and how they 
dealt with this aspect of their identity. We carried out a survey of 126 barristers, QCs, professional 
training students, and pupils. This survey was delivered online and publicised as widely as possible4. 
We followed this up with face to face or telephone interviews of 38 of the respondents,5 using a 
semi structured interview guide. These interviews lasted for approximately an hour each, and 
allowed us to explore in more depth some of the issues that were arising out of the survey.  
The research is currently being written up, but preliminary findings have been published (Mason and 
Vaughan, 2017). Findings so far have crystallised around a few themes. Of most interest to the 
profession so far6 appears to have been the prevalence of homophobia at the Bar. For example, we 
                                                            
1 I am grateful to Naomi Creutzfeld, Kirsten McConnachie, and Victoria Brooks for their encouragement and 
comments on earier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Alison Eardley for providing the conditions to 
work on a first draft of the paper during a writing retreat.  
2 SLSA Annual Conference, Bristol University, 27-29 March 2018 
3 With Steven Vaughan (UCL) 
4 We were concerned to publicise beyond the LGBT support and social networks at the Bar (Freebar and 
BLAGG) because we were anxious not to limit our sample to those barristers who in some way engage with 
those networks, and therefore might have a particular experience. We distributed the survey with the help of 
the Bar Standards Board, the Bar Council, and the Inns of Court. 
5 The final question in our survey was an invitation to participate in face to face interviews 
6 Headlines included “Inns of Court accused of not doing enough to combat homophobis as research uncovers 
discrimination”(Hilborne, 2017), and “Senior barrister told BPTC student ‘I don’t trust fags like you’, shocking 
new LGBT+ research reveals” (King, 2017) ( with similar in Wareham, 2017) 
found that 26.5% of our respondents had experienced discrimination relating to their sexuality 
sometimes, often or frequently (a further 25.6% reporting it had occurred, but rarely). This can be 
compared to the general working population where Stonewall found that 19% of LGB employees had 
experienced verbal bullying because of their sexuality. The interviews allowed us to observe that 
barristers tended to minimise these incidents and were reluctant to confront prejudice.  
More theoretically interesting, to me at least, was the way these barristers constructed their 
identities. We found that 58% of respondents had actively concealed their sexuality in a work 
context, and 40% had lied about it. Exploring this further in interviews it was clear that barristers 
were recognising the concealable nature of this characteristic and also that some questioned the 
propriety of being out in the workplace. Some gave explanations which revealed underlying 
constructions of the workplace as places free from sexuality, and of LGBTQI+ identities being solely 
about sex. The recent #metoo movement has given lie to the first construction, as indeed did some 
of our other responses, and made it easier to see the way in which the hegemony of heterosexual 
masculinity renders it invisible, giving the impression of an absence of sexuality, and in doing so 
serves the needs of that hegemony.  
The research also allowed us to explore some of the more subtle ways that LGBTQI+ sexualities bring 
disadvantages in this context, particularly if they remain concealed. These included descriptions of 
the added cognitive work that results from having to be guarded in conversations whilst networking 
and well as negative impacts on general wellbeing. Conversely there was clear indication that the 
ability to ‘bring your whole self’ to your work and your relationship with clients was an advantage of 
being out, and from some, that there may be recognition of an ethical or political requirement to be 
out, either in solidarity with those who are unable to conceal their sexuality or as a general 
opportunity to push back against normativity in what is otherwise a strongly conservative 
profession.  
The driver for this chapter is a consciousness that arose that I shared a particular social location 
with, or proximity to, the participants in the research. I had disclosed in the participant information 
sheet that I was a barrister who had practiced at the self employed bar and I came to realise during 
the interviews that I had been assuming that others would make assumptions about my sexual 
orientation simply from my engagement in this research, and perhaps from other aspects of my 
behaviour and presentation which may be readable. In the planning of the research I had viewed my 
professional status and experience a strength that allowed me to understand the working 
environment of the research participants, but hadn’t really viewed my sexual orientation in the 
same way. My initial gut reaction to this issue had been to question my suitability to do the research, 
driven by concerns that were, at root, about objectivity, and in particular (on closer examination) a 
concept of objectivity tied up with distance and detachment. It is these questions that were the 
initial spark for the reflection and reading described in this chapter.   
The starting point is a fairly traditional conceptualisation of objectivity, an example of which is:  
“Objectivity (Objectivist, objective) refers to the removal of the persona (emotions, knowledge, 
experience, values and so forth) of the researcher from the research process. It is seen as central to 
the quality of research based on epistemological assumptions that truth can be determined as 
something distinct from particular contexts or participants” (Somekh and Lewin, 2005, p. 347) 
Objectivity has variously been attributed to knowledge claims which are better supported than 
competitors, procedures which are assumed to be fair, often due to their standardization, types of 
knowledge seeking communities. It is commonly associated with the concept of neutrality.  [Harding] 
This chapter is based then on the journey I followed from a fairly naïve perspective on this issue, a 
perspective that I believe more easily gives me useful access to a process of discovery of various 
viewpoints. These questions allowed me to explore the literature on objectivity in methodology and 
I of course found a fairly rich literature, particularly from feminist scholarship (see below), but also 
from critical race theory and research concerned with colonialism and neo-colonialism (e.g. Wagle 
and Cantaffa (2008), Kanuha (2000), hooks (1989), Daza (2008), Whitinui (2014)) (see also Skeet, this 
volume). Each of these of course has its own particular concern and focus, as does the queer 
approach which is influential on my thinking here (and in general). Queer theory is notoriously 
resistant to definition, and indeed resistance to definition, boundaries and normative structures is 
one of its paradigmatic features. As Berlant and Warner (1995) describe “queer theory is not the 
theory of anything in particular, and has no precise bibliographic shape.” (p. 344) For me, queer 
theory’s interest and character lies in its rejection of normativity, binarism and fixity which has roots 
in its interest in sexuality and gender, and related dynamics of power, control, violence and 
resistance but which has potential to deploy its tools beyond this. See e.g. Marinucci (2016) and 
Warner (1993) (on meanings of queer), Butler (2002) (queering kinship and race), Halberstam (2011) 
(queering the concept of failure, and applying queer theory to neoliberalism). Its suspicion of 
normativity and boundaries, and sensitivity to power structures has clear utility when considering 
the concerns around the controlling nature of the rhetoric of objectivity which unfold over the 
course of this chapter. 
This journey to a richer understanding of ‘objectivity’ broadly followed 4 stages, and the same route 
underpins the structure of this chapter. Firstly, I had the fairly swift realisation that sharing social 
location7 does not preclude a robust analysis of that social location. I arrived at this position initially 
through consideration of ideas of management or auditing of subjectivity and a recognition that 
access and trust can be obtained through a degree of matching. Here too there was also an inkling of 
recognition of the absurdity of the alternative: that only straight people can research queers, and 
only men can research women, only white people can research people of colour, and importantly 
the observation that the converse of each of these does not appear to be the practice. Next came 
the realisation that in fact striving for objectivism in the traditional sense has long been abandoned 
by many scholars. Thirdly was the realisation that there is a viewpoint that considers objectivism not 
only unnecessary but also undesirable and damaging. Finally, there was the discovery of a range of 
positions which each conclude that researching with a recognition and to some extent a utilisation of 
the self or subjectivity can be particularly enriching and empowering and can lead to ways of looking 
at research where other values come into play, that may feel more like they relate to ethics than to 
epistemology per se.  
Difficulties achieving objectivity and benefits of membership: 
Auditing, access, authority and the problem of categories 
Auditing  
Researchers such as Peshkin (1988) demonstrate an auditing approach to subjectivity, suggesting a 
‘formal, systematic monitoring of self.’ (p. 20) This is not limited to characteristics, but also include 
transient preferences and tendencies, such as justice seeking or a tendency to want to rescue. 
Whilst Peshkin recognises some benefits from his audited subjectivities, the general tenor here is 
that these are to be recognised so they can be guarded against or confessed. For example he talks of 
                                                            
7 Alternatively sharing a characteristic of interest to the research  
taming his subjectivity, and considers the importance of giving himself a warning against ‘perceiving 
just that which my own untamed sentiments have sought out and served up as data’ (p. 20). He also 
claims that it can avoid the sense of producing an ‘in house’ work which would convey both 
permission to write and an interest in the subject’s wellbeing or case, and would avoid the risk of 
‘going native’ as he describes.     
Access/trust 
Whilst auditing guards against the risks that a researcher’s social proximity might pose, proximity 
also offers direct benefits to the research which should be acknowledged. One of these is the trust 
that might be gained from participants. This was surely part of my motivation for including my 
professional status, but is also one that applies to other aspects of identity. The idea being that 
LGBTQI+ individuals are more likely to trust that aspect of their experience to someone who is also 
LGBTQI+. That as a result they are more likely to participate in the research and when they do so 
their responses are more likely to be freer. Justifications for this have included perceptions that the 
researcher is less likely to be biased and more likely to be accurate, a reduction in power relations 
between researchers and participants, or the promise of more effective communication (Rhodes 
(1994) and Gunaratnam (2003) cited in McDonald (2013). 
This is an aspect of the research process where the concealable nature of sexual orientation brings 
with it particular issues. Sexual orientation can be performed in countless ways, and where 
performance is ambiguous, can be assumed. On a practical level Wagle and Cantaffa (2008) describe 
how a researcher’s gayness can become questioned when it is performed differently to the way that 
gayness is performed by participants. On an ethical level questions also arise as to whether there is a 
duty to disclose relevant characteristics, particularly where these are mistakenly assumed, given that 
the argument relating to recruitment suggests that social proximity matters to respondents 
(McDonald, 2013).   
Authority/Voice 
It has been argued that the only site from which knowledge claims can be made about a particular 
group is from within that group, primarily due to proximity to the experiences observed and 
contextual understanding (Smith (2008) cited in McDonald (2013)). Taking a more moderate 
approach are we able to hold that certain identities have more authority in making certain truth 
claims? As bell hooks (1989) does, do we say that those outside of the social location can write and 
research, but questions will remain as to whether they are the most authoritative. Standpoint 
epistemology, discussed further below, has been described as a performance of marginalised groups 
who are seen as having a more complete view precisely because of their marginality, and the need 
that this brings for an awareness of the dominant perspective in order to survive (Nielsen, 1990 cited 
in King, 1999).  
From this perspective then, in addition to access to participants and their viewpoints, membership 
of the group also brings with it an insider knowledge that has the potential to lend authority to 
claims made. In this we begin to see a switching of the status quo where the distance currently 
equated with objectivity, begins to be an obstacle to knowledge. We also detect signs that closeness 
might offer something more important, which I will return to in the next section. 
The problem of categories 
Whilst the ideas around matching participants to researchers seem attractive there is also some 
uneasiness here. When we take our participants to be solely the characteristic that we are 
examining, that we also share, we are neglecting to consider all their other facets, some of which 
might not be shared, and we are in danger of assuming a shared experience that may in fact be quite 
varied. Gestalt theory reminds us that individuals are part of a broader phenomenological field 
within which different aspects emerge from the ground to be figural, depending on the individual 
and their current circumstances (Joyce and Sills, 2018). Adopting a presumption of stability and 
homogeneity within any category (race, gender, sexual orientation etc) ignores the instability and 
heterogeneity that we know in fact exists. There is also, at first blush, something quite un-queer 
about all this talk of categories. Queer theory has a tendency towards breaking down stable 
categories (Berlant and Warner, 1995), yet here we are seen to be reifying them to justify our 
research methodologies. One response is to accept this, and to acknowledge it as a provisional and 
pragmatic essentialism, although perhaps here the terminology of distance becomes useful; rather 
than considering a binary of shared/not-shared what we are in fact discussing are degrees of 
closeness. That my respondents and I identify as LGBTQI+ doesn’t mean that we share an identity, 
but rather that our social position is closer, at least on one dimension, so that in a multi-dimensional 
social space we come into closer proximity than if we occupied a different position on that 
dimension. It becomes an acknowledging of a propensity to shared narratives or histories, but not a 
guarantee.  This does however require us to take a more nuanced approach to assessing the degree 
of authority a voice has. Letherby (2011) cautions us that “if we accept a position which implies that 
there is only one (real, accurate, best) experience this can only be built upon the suppression of less 
powerful voices” (p68). 
The problem of objectivity 
Whilst I have so far been discussing ways in which I found excuses for straying into territory that 
risks losing objectivity, there are stronger positions that can be taken that suggest that far from 
excusing ourselves when we stray into this territory, we should be going further and be taking a 
sceptical, if not hostile, view of the notion of objectivity. Katz-Rothman (2007) reminds us of the 
duty to offer more than a distant, uninvolved approach: 
“Our work of sense-making is a basic human job, done traditionally through story-
telling. Whether the stories we use are our own, or those of our informants, or 
those we cull from tables of statistically organized data, we remain story-tellers, 
narrators, making sense of the world as best we can. Our ethical obligations go 
beyond what we owe our subjects – as urgently important as it is to protect them, 
to preserve their privacy and their feelings. We owe something too, to our readers 
and to the larger community to which we offer our work. Among the many things 
we owe them, is an honesty about ourselves: who we are as characters in our 
own stories and as actors in our own research.” 
This line of thinking has been pursued further by adopting visual or spatial metaphors [cross ref to 
AL chapter?] for the traditional concept of objectivity. Haraway (1988) adopts a visual metaphor, 
one that is familiar in the sense that we are used to discussions of viewpoints and perspectives, and 
indeed it is these that we are often anxious to avoid when we strive for objectivity. She describes 
how the drawing of boundaries of inside/outside a certain position is a ‘power move’. In this account 
the claiming of objectivity is the leaping of an unmarked body into a conquering gaze which allows it 
(him) to see without being seen. In claiming objectivity, the researcher claims for himself an identity 
free from characteristics that would make the research suspect. This very logic can be seen to be 
based on the problematisation of marginalised identities, which are seen as marked, and the 
valorisation of majority identities which are viewed as unmarked. The claim of objectivity becomes a 
‘god trick’ of seeing from nowhere in particular, an unmarked position without limits or 
responsibility. For Haraway, a more properly objective approach entails accepting that any view is 
from a particular and specific embodiment. There is no ‘view-from-nowhere’ or ‘view-from-
everywhere’. To acknowledge that this view is from a particular embodiment would acknowledge 
that knowing is never complete, but rather is always partial and constructed or stitched together 
imperfectly.  
Whilst Haraway (1988) utilises a metaphor of vision to examine the power dynamics involved in 
objectivity Heshusius (1994) utilises distance. For Heshusius traditional objectivity is associated with 
distance between participant and researcher, and additionally with control of that distance over 
which the researcher is deemed to have both responsibility and power. The objective researcher is 
exhorted to maintain a distance from their subject. The dangerously close researcher is encouraged 
to take pains to confess that closeness, to manage it and to maintain objective distance. Heshusius 
describes how when we are confronted with subjectivity we seek to exclude, manage or restrain it, 
and therefore fulfil our desire for control. However, in doing so we are missing out on an important 
way of knowing. Instead Heshusius calls for a participatory consciousness where we embed 
ourselves in what we seek to understand through a recognition of kinship. She describes how this 
involves an attempt to be with the other: “I had to completely and nonevaluatively observe my 
personal reactions and in that attentiveness, dissolve (rather than manage or restrain) them, which 
opened up a mode of access that was not there before” (p. 19). The description of participatory 
consciousness does not call for either a particular distance from or closeness to the subject, rather it 
calls for an attempt to see the lives of participants in a way that echoes Roger’s (1959) concept of 
empathy: an attempt to enter the world of the respondent. 
For both of these theorists, adopting a critical approach to the traditional concept of objectivity is 
not simply about knowing better (although this can be read into each). It is, in addition, about an 
ethical imperative to challenge objectivity and therefore to challenge the underlying power 
structures that it is complicit in. Heshusius (1994) for example is critical of approaches which 
‘manage’ subjectivity as legitimizing the purported link between knowing and control of distance, 
and in doing so leaving hidden power inequalities unchallenged. Using Harraway (1988) we can quite 
clearly see the radical power of claiming a perspective. The practice of drawing attention to one’s 
perspective, in saying ‘This is the location from which I am making claims’, draws attention to the 
situated nature of all claims, even those which claim to be from no-where. We shine a light on the 
unmarked position and in doing so, mark it. In claiming a location therefore, we not only gain access 
to insights in our own particular research projects, but we challenge implicit claims that allow 
privileged access to assertions of purity of knowledge.   
I argue that looking at these ideas of distance and vision through a queer (or even just LGBTQ+) lens 
allows us also to think about how the myth of objectivity operates within us as individual 
researchers. If I am exhorted to control my subjectivity and if this control strategy is internalised 
(and to operate effectively it must be), then there must be one “I” doing the constraining and 
another “I” being constrained. Looking at this in relation to concealable identifications and shiftable 
locations such as queerness allows us to raise particularly interesting questions. When I was, at the 
spark of this chapter, questioning my standing to do research because of a threat to objectivity was 
that the unmarked “I” speaking? That “I” after all is simply a white, middle class, western, cis-male. 
Was that the unmarked “I” silencing the queer “I”? As a gay, white, middle class, western, cis-male I 
have immediate access to a privileged unmarked position simply by hiding away the first of those 
descriptors. But what is the cost of that? And what if the descriptor I needed to drop was one that 
was inscribed on my body (e.g. woman, black) and could therefore not be dropped so easily and with 
such confidence that it would not be re-inserted by a reader. And in answering those questions, do I 
again find kinship with, and answers from, my research participants? Do I step down from a position 
of power as the researcher and (metaphorically) ask my participants how to be? In doing so, to give 
me answers around the cost of adopting the unmarked position I would listen to the participants 
who said8: 
“…that I think I’ve spent such a long time hating myself, a long time being shut 
away, a long time not being as productive as I can be because I wasn’t being the 
person I’m supposed to be” [P15] 
“I think it’s really important because I remember how unhappy I really was in 
university when I wasn’t out and the efforts I made to lie about it… People are 
human beings, they’re going to ask you about your life, you know, where you go, 
what you do and there’s only so far you can continue to avoid it.” [B23] 
“And so actually, a big part of working with someone to get them to the place 
where they will give of their best as a witness and in terms of giving instructions... 
Then, for me, that extra bit beyond the sort of pure intellectual evaluation and 
advice is about actually relating to them as a real person and trying to get the 
best out of them, or get them to the best place for something. And I don't know 
how I would do that if I didn't use ‘me’, and an honesty and an authenticity with 
them.” [QC39] 
I would also hear the participants who said:  
“ And then I’m thinking do I want to confuse the picture anymore being a black 
person, being somebody of 30, by adding to the fact that you’re gay.” [P15] 
“I think sometimes it's impossible really to separate that from the fact that I'm an 
ethnic minority and a woman because sometimes there's so many things, so 
many factors that make me 'other' that that one is the only one that isn't 
immediately obvious. So sometimes I think selfishly I make my life a little bit 
easier by slightly avoiding any questions [on sexuality] or anything that could 
bring it up in context where I just don't want to deal with it, I just don't want to 
deal with the reaction or with the awkwardness that the other person then feels 
because they've made a heteronormative assumption and then feel flustered 
about it. Sometimes I just don't really want to deal with it. And I don't like that, 
it's not something I'm happy about in myself, but I must admit that does happen.” 
[S27] 
In addition to the ethical issue of choosing to conceal when others cannot and thus being complicit 
in oppressional dynamics, and the practical issue of always being at risk of failing to conceal, there is 
also a personal cost. For example, the description of a socially desirable “I” silencing a more truly felt 
“I” echoes with theories from person-centered psychotherapy of discrepancies between an ideal self 
which becomes manifest and an organismic self which remains hidden leading to psychological 
distress (Rogers, 1959). The pressure or decision to conceal therefore becomes deeply anti-
therapeutic. 
                                                            
8 All quotes from participants drawn from the publication referenced at Mason and Vaughan (2017) 
Presence in research 
If after considering all of the above, I am to reach the conclusion that ‘objectivity’ as traditionally 
defined is at least, not always necessary, or, as I think I do, that it is a concept that I have an ethical 
duty to hold as suspect, then where do I go from here? What other approaches do I have when 
considering the validity of my own, and indeed others, research?  Participatory consciousness, 
standpoint epistemology, strong objectivity and theorized subjectivity all offer approaches which 
are, in places, subtly different, but provide a menu from which to draw tools to deal with the issues 
raised above. In this section I offer up a summary of each before considering how they build upon 
each other in the hope that it will afford the reader the opportunity to explore these ideas further: 
Participatory Consciousness: Heshusius (1994) asks “Don’t we reach out to what we want to know 
with all of ourselves, because we can’t do anything else?” She calls for us to engage in participatory 
consciousness, a mode of being that seeks knowledge through recognition of kinship and a ‘being 
with’ the subject rather than attempting separation through managed subjectivity. As she describes, 
“it refers to a mode of consciousness, a way of being in the world, that is characterized by what 
Schachtel (1959) calls ‘allocentric’ knowing (as contrasted to autocentric knowing), a way of knowing 
that is concerned with both ‘the totality of the act of interest’ and with the ‘participation of the total 
person’ (of the knower)” (Heshusius, 1994, p. 16). Here then we have an approach with degrees of 
identification and merging, of rejection of the necessity of individuation, objectification and indeed 
subjectification as starting points for knowing and acceptance of the self as being epistemically 
related to the other.  
Standpoint epistemology: Here we see a range of approaches which are founded on an 
understanding that some social locations can facilitate access to knowledge whilst others are 
epistemic blockages (Hammersley, 2011). They take as their starting point a conflict model of 
society, recognising social inequality, in contrast to the consensus model which forms the foundation 
of objectivism (Harding, 2014). In an approach that evokes Oscar Wilde’s statement (voiced by Lord 
Darlington) “We are all in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars” (Wilde, 1893) part of 
the reasoning of this approach is that those in marginalized positions have easier access to 
unexamined assumptions of the dominant group, either through their lived experience which in part 
runs contrary to these assumptions or through experiencing the impact of these assumptions (King, 
1999). The approach also draws on the idea that those in dominant groups tend to have much less 
motivation to examine these assumptions as any effect they have on them is likely to be positive, 
whilst for marginalised groups accessing these insights can lead to liberation (Hammersley, 2011).  
As discussed above, this approach in common with others raises some concerns, however these are 
not insurmountable. For example there is a need to find a way to avoid both homogenisation of 
categories and a setting up of a hierarchy of oppressions. This approach also seemingly implies a 
real, accurate, best experience, and as Letherby points out this seems inevitably to be built upon the 
suppression of less powerful voices. However if we consider Haraway’s (1988) reminder that all 
knowledge is partial and needs to be stitched together we do, to some degree, ameliorate this 
position. King (1999) uses three criteria to assess standpoint work: Representation, identification 
and affiliation. Representation refers to the degree to which the writing evokes or connects to the 
phenomena that motivated the writing. Identification refers to the pragmatic essentialism of 
deploying a category, in order that that category can be represented. King (1999) points out that if 
this is not done then standpoint epistemology cannot be leveraged against the dominant ideology. 
Finally, affiliation is the positioning of the writer in relation to the identified category. King (1999) 
suggests “As a writer, I must find the part of my self(ves) that registers a trustworthy parallel to the 
experiences of the subject I am describing/interpreting” whilst acknowledging that “trust is a 
discourse that is conditioned by effective use of language” (p. 487).  
Strong Objectivity: Building on standpoint epistemology Harding (2014) suggests research should be 
evaluated based on who is putting forward a knowledge claims and what its implications are, 
including, but not limited to knowledge production, so that we also look at emancipatory aims and 
expose background structures and assumptions to scrutiny. Strong objectivity does not seek to 
abandon the valorisation of objectivity, but rather deploys the decoupling of the concepts of 
objectivity and neutrality, particularly as it observes the way that neutrality can mask the value 
laden and knowledge distorting interests that constitute a project (Hammersley, 2011). Harding 
(2014) emphasises the importance of extending what we consider to be ‘methodology’, and what we 
therefore consider to need an objective approach, to beyond the start of the research project. This 
therefore would include, for example, the decision to pursue a particular problem and ignore 
another. Brooks, in this volume, demonstrates the importance of also including consideration of 
ethics approval as part of the process of ‘methodology’.  
Theorized Subjectivity: Some of the approaches above seem inclined to deny any special status of 
the researcher. Theorized subjectivity allows this back in, to a degree. In common with other 
approaches it acknowledges the personhood of the researcher and in fact claims that doing so 
“could feasibly lead to the conclusion that our work is more objective, in that our work, if not value-
free is value-explicit” (Letherby, 2011, p. 70) in that it allows us to acknowledge both the inevitability 
of bias (even from the unmarked position) and the usefulness of reflection. This approach retains at 
least some of the kinship found in participatory consciousness, in that it acknowledges that we all, 
researcher and researched theorise our own subjectivities, but it also recognises that the researcher, 
when doing so, benefits from training in second order theorising and also will often have access to 
multiple accounts (for example through interview based research). This allows the researcher to 
make use of what has gone before, whilst also remaining open to use of their own subjectivity.  
Here then we have a range of approaches that in combination (or perhaps individually) offer us a 
way out of the objectivity trap whilst allowing us to maintain a robustness and a trust in our research 
processes.  From standpoint epistemology we have an empowering realisation that actually a 
marginalised position can not only be valid but can also be one which motivates and strengthens our 
abilities to see and be critical of normative assumptions and to make knowledge claims which are in 
fact more robust. Strong objectivity adds to that an additional criterion upon which we evaluate 
research: the degree to which it meets emancipatory aims. Participatory consciousness encourages 
us to do this in a way that allows us to be more fully with research participants, whilst theorized 
subjectivity provides an understanding of how we can do this, how we can acknowledge and use our 
subjectivity, be with the research participant, yet still bring in our training and our specific position 
as researchers (which after all is clearly a part of our own subjectivity).  
Intersections 
Whilst some of the benefits discussed have been related to the researcher’s social proximity to, or 
shared characteristics with, the specific issue examined, others may be more transferable. In the 
former category, issues of access or trust, and to some degree authority and voice, are clearly built 
upon proximity between researcher and researched and the (perceived or actual) knowledge gained 
from the researcher’s lived experience which may be specific to the issue of concern. However, 
some of the ideas discussed above hint at an opportunity to work across intersections. The god trick 
highlighted by Haraway as the mechanism by which power is taken by those who are ‘unmarked’ 
(1988) begins to be dismantled by putting the unmarked position into sharp relief against our open 
acceptance of our markings. This emancipatory action is of service regardless of the type of marking, 
and indeed is surely stronger when the revealed markings collectively appear across a number of 
dimensions. Similarly, Heshusius’ (1994) rejection of managed subjectivity is explicitly aimed at 
dissolving the purported link between knowledge and control of distance, which is complicit in 
allowing this unmarked body to see and not be seen (Haraway, 1988). Again, it seems to matter not 
which dimension this control of distance is operating on (as it appears to operate on all), and any 
dissolution of it is therefore of benefit. However, in addition to this one-for-all approach focused on 
the dismantling or erosion of power structures that detriment each, there is also support for the 
idea that experience of one area of subjugation allows, to a degree, a stronger claim to research in 
an alternative area. Harraway (1988) explains that the subjugated position is a vantage point with an 
advantage, vision is better from below in the sense that the subjugated standpoint is not an 
innocent one but is much more likely to be onto the god trick generally. “’Subjugated’ standpoints 
are preferred because they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming 
accounts of the world” (Haraway, 1988, p. 584).  This would seem to be true regardless of which 
characteristic has lead to the subjugation. I also take a lead from some of the research participants 
who expressed the way that subjugation can lead to empathy across characteristics, for example:  
“I’m known as being someone with good client care skills, I’m a good listener, I’m 
told that I’m sympathetic and empathic... is it the sexuality side of my personality 
coming through?... I think I do feel a more rounded barrister in that sense 
because of my sexuality…. I think that when you are a member of a minority, you 
have a better understanding of how majorities and minorities interrelate…” [B19] 
 
Conclusion 
The relatively small, and momentary doubt that started this chapter has lead to a complete 
rethinking of the way I see objectivity and research more generally. And I suggest it is a momentary 
doubt that would not have been available to me had I not been a queer (or alternatively female, or 
black, or HIV+,  or migrant, or disabled etc) researcher. Having been persuaded of not just the 
unhelpfulness but also the damaging nature of the traditional concept of objectivity, the 
conceptualisation related to distance and disinterest, I am left open to a range of ways of thinking 
differently about the robustness and the value of research. These new ways of thinking will shape 
my research and my research agenda and also shape the way I evaluate the research of others. In 
doing so there is no abandoning of the demand for quality, but rather a change in the way that I 
evaluate that quality both in my own work and that of others. In doing so I am taking what I believe 
to be a more ethical, critical and thoughtful approach through the use of the approaches listed on 
page above, not doctrinally but in a way that allows and requires a deeper, more reflective 
evaluation of quality. The insights from standpoint feminism relating to the need to shine a light on 
the unmarked perspective align with the idea that  “[q]ueer commentary has involved a certain 
amount of experimenting, of prancing and squatting on the academic stage. This is partly to remind 
people that there is an academic stage and that its protocols and proprieties have maintained an 
invisible heteronormativity, one that infiltrates our profession, our knowledge...” (Berlant and 
Warner, 1995). Similarly, the tendancy of queer theory to reject boundaries, and the potential it has 
to deploy its modes of understanding beyond its roots in thinking about sexuality and gender also 
has echoes in the insight from Haraway (1988) that “[t]he knowing self is partial in all its guises, 
never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched together 
imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another” 
(p. 586). The synthesis of these insights calls more widely for an approach to knowledge that is 
vigilent to stories that we are told, and that we tell, about who we need to be as researchers and 
how we relate to and differ from those we research. An approach which considers  how we, queerly, 
reach across, dissolve and question the imagined boundaries that we find between ‘us’ and our 
subjects and between and within disciplines to strive perhaps towards a productively undisciplined 
(Halberstam, 2011) approach to socio-legal research. 
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